Each time, A puts out 1, 2, or 3 stones, and B guesses. If B guesses correctly, the stones A puts out go to B; if B does not guess correctly, B pays A 1 stone. This process is repeated, and the one with more stones at the end wins.
Obviously, this is a zero-sum game problem.
Let the probabilities of A putting out 1, 2, or 3 stones be α1,α2,α3,αi⩾0, then α1+α2+α3=1;
Let the probabilities of B guessing 1, 2, or 3 stones be β1,β2,β3,βj⩾0, then β1+β2+β3=1.
Then, the number of stones B wins each game, X, is a random variable, and the probability distribution of X is shown in Table 1.
Table 1
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hlineX & -1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\
\hline P(X) & 1−(α1β1+α2β2+α3β3) & α1β1 & α2β2 & α3β3 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
The mathematical expectation of the random variable X is
E(X)=E(X,α1,α2,α3,β1,β2,β3)=2α1β1+3α2β2+4α3β3−1.
Using the Lagrange multiplier method, we can obtain the unique saddle point of equation (1)
(α1,α2,α3,β1,β2,β3)=(136,134,133,136,134,133).
The value at the saddle point is
E(X)=E(X,136,134,133,136,134,133)=−131.
From this, we get
(1) A's optimal winning strategy
should be to use the probabilities of putting out stones as
α1=136,α2=134,α3=133.