Solution:
Answer: 30.
The second player can play the following strategy:
(1) If the first player plays 2n−1 for 1≤n≤9, then he replies 2n with the opposite sign.
(2) If the first player plays 2n for 1≤n≤9 then he replies 2n−1 with the opposite sign.
(3) If the first player plays 19 or 20, then he plays the other with the same sign.
This secures a score of at least 39 (from (3)) less 9×1 (from (1) and (2)). So he can ensure a score of at least 30.
The first player can play the following strategy:
(1) He opens with 1.
(2) If the second player plays 2n for 1≤n≤9, then he replies with 2n+1 with the opposite sign.
(3) If the second player plays 2n+1 for 1≤n≤9, then he replies with 2n with the opposite sign.
(4) If any of these replies are impossible, or if the second player plays 20, then he replies with the highest number available with the opposite sign.
If the second player does not play 20 until the last move, then this strategy ensures a score of at most 1 (from (1)) +9×1 (from (2) and (3)) +20=30.
Now suppose that the second player plays 20, a1, a2, …, an (where 1≤n≤9) which require a reply under (4). The reason a1 required a move under (4) was that a1−1 or a1+1 was the 1st player's response to 20. Similarly, the reason a2 required a move under (4) was that a2−1 or a2+1 was the 1st player's response to a2, and so on. Thus the increment to the absolute value from these moves is at most ∣20−a1∣+∣a1−a2∣+…+∣an−1−an∣+∣an∣=20+n.
The increment from the moves under (2) and (3) is (9−n)×1, and the increment from the move under (1) is 1. Hence the maximum absolute value is 30.
Since the 1st player has a strategy to do no worse than 30 and the 2nd player has a strategy to do no worse than 30, these strategies must actually be optimal.